As OPEC+ slams the brakes on output hikes after a modest 137,000 bpd increase in December—fearing a 2026 glut that could drag Brent below $60—analysts warn the cartel’s fragile unity is cracking under budget-strapped members’ pressure.
In this exclusive Invezz interview, Igor Isaev, Doctor of Technical Sciences and Head of Analytics at Mind Money, predicts Brent averaging $60-$70 next year, driven by EV efficiencies and US shale resilience, while Russia’s pivot from Europe reshapes gas flows without OPEC’s shadow.
Drawing on Mind Money’s Oxford-Cambridge weather models and inter-commodity spread analysis, Isaev unpacks how sanctions, surpluses, and seasonal swings are rewriting energy playbooks in late 2025.
Isaev further stated that Mind Money’s weather models suggest Europe is likely to experience a winter colder than the last 15-year average.
He added that this will increase demand for gas, and the models already show rising demand in the US during October-December.
Additionally, Isaev believes that India may not be able to abandon Russian crude oil completely even with pressure from the US.
I am sure that India will not completely abandon Russian oil anyway. The volumes are too large, and the market always gives room for agreements.
Below are edited excerpts from the interview:
Gas market insights
Invezz:With OPEC+ pausing further hikes after December’s 137,000 bpd increase amid glut fears, how is this shift testing the cartel’s unity and influencing Russia’s gas export strategies?
In my opinion, OPEC+ has no other choice but to slow down its addition, since the oil market is saturated and capacities are overfilled.
The current price of Brent at $63-65 per barrel is already quite low, and this way, the cartel has to try to keep the price from falling further. And while the cost is not at its worst lows, I believe the OPEC+ unity remains the same.
As for gas, it lives its own life and doesn’t correlate all that much with the oil market. There is no gas “cartel,” as OPEC+ and oil restrictions do not apply to it, so the market is comparatively free.
However, gas is also getting cheaper, and I think it’s because there are dumping processes going on, affecting both the oil and gas markets. Even in spite of the forecasts of a cold winter, which naturally should increase prices, not vice versa.
As for Russia’s strategy, it has changed, but the reason is more about Europe’s refusal to buy the country’s gas.
As a result, it has lost almost 140 billion cubic meters of European demand, so now the country is forced to rebuild without the usual market.
It’s hard, however, to link this to any of OPEC+ decisions, nor can I say that this event impacts gas prices dramatically.
Invezz:Russia’s planned gas output has risen to 695 bcm in 2025—despite Ukraine transit halt—how might your weather models forecast European demand impacts this winter?
Our weather model, developed in collaboration with scientists from Oxford and Cambridge, has already helped us to forecast the demand this winter.
Europe is headed for a winter colder than 15-year average, and it will definitely increase the gas demand.
The model’s results from October to December showed this kind of demand growth also in the United States, and both forecasts were fully confirmed by later data releases.
We have also found out that there will be a moderate downward correction in price. Thanks to our own development, we can also estimate peaks of volatility in advance and predict the behaviour of gas prices.
In other words, we can see when the market may enter a “storm” and how this will affect the prices later on.
Invezz:US LNG exports are tightening markets ahead of 2026 ramps—how could Trump’s Day 1 pause lift reshape global pricing and Mind Money’s inter-commodity spreads?
I would say that there is no tightening of markets for now — it is redundancy that shapes today’s pricing. The European gas market is experiencing a calmness that no one expected before.
Just a few years ago, when Europe stopped buying Russian gas, the market was highly volatile, and prices soared 10-15 times. Today, the situation is very different.
Gas quotes at the Dutch and British hubs are almost not moving and even fall below normal levels.
There are so many LNG contracts accumulated that, even in the cold winter, Europe is covered by about 110-120% of its future needs. And the main source of this surplus is the United States, as up to 55-60% of Europe’s LNG imports come from there.
That’s why the Mind Money’s weather model shows that Trump’s hypothetical “first-day” decision to cut off LNG exports would break the balance.
If such a move were made, the gas-oil spread would widen sharply, and prices would jump because a key supplier would suddenly disappear. Still, the effect would be limited or short-term.
Europe has already learned how to change their main suppliers, so even if American gas disappears, it can be quickly replaced by Qatari, Algerian or African LNG.
Oil market dynamics
Invezz:OPEC+ has raised output every month since April 2025 despite Brent stuck below $80 — how much longer can the cartel’s unity survive continuous voluntary increases?
As a matter of fact, cartel countries have stopped doing that only recently.
Over these months, the rise in output has created a big increase in supply, and it has posed a risk of oversupply in 2026-2027, which the IEA explicitly warned us about.
At the same time, what I find surprising is how OPEC+ remains more or less united in its decisions. Some countries have a bursting budget, so they need to pump more. Others have their own political interests.
So far, they all agree on one thing: that production needs to be increased. But the problem is that no one can keep that balance for long.
If the excess becomes too obvious and prices go down sharply, weak budget countries will pressure the cartel a lot. Then OPEC+ will either show fractures or start looking for new ways to influence the market.
As long as the interests coincide, the unity lives on — but I don’t think it’s going to last forever.
Invezz:China’s refinery runs are down 600,000 barrels per day year-to-date and strategic reserves look full — where do you see the next demand surprise coming from?
To me, what is happening now in China looks like a temporary pause, as they simply have clogged strategic reserves.
But domestic demand has not gone away; they still consume a lot of energy.
As soon as their reserves start to thin — when people start travelling more during holidays and seasonal peaks — consumption will jump up again.
The Chinese New Year, for example, is only in February, so the growth will be rapid, as we have seen before. But if we talk about countries other than China, then demand surprises can be expected from India.
The Indian economy is accelerating at a pretty high speed there, factories are expanding, and there are more and more cars on the roads. In other words, they need more fuel every year, so purchases are also growing, especially from Russia.
Oil benchmarks
Invezz:WTI Midland’s inclusion in Dated Brent from Jan 2026 — how big an arbitrage edge does this hand US crude exporters versus West African grades?
Although many say it’s an important change, I don’t see any revolution here if I’m being honest.
Yes, WTI Midland being included in the Brent basket will affect the global benchmark, as it will become easier to work with it through hedging and various financial instruments.
But I think it’s a little more than a gift to the speculator market: liquidity will increase, more players will appear, more deals will be based “on the difference.”
For real oil buyers, none of this fundamentally changes the picture. This is more about trading on the stock exchange than about who will win in the physical market — the USA or West Africa.
Invezz:Russian Urals discounts collapsed to -$2 after Red Sea flows resumed — sustainable, or just a temporary rerouting gift?
The way I see it, when the Urals discount narrowed to –$2 after the resumption of traffic through the Red Sea, it was just a temporary reaction to the unloading of routes.
When the movement recovered, some of the supplies quickly reached the buyers, and for a short period, there was a feeling of excess liquidity, hence the temporary price stabilisation.
However, this effect does not last long, because the very nature of the Urals discount is not related to logistics.
The main pressure is created by sanctions and limited access to traditional markets, and these factors are much more stable than any temporary disruptions or openings of sea routes.
In any case, even under the conditions of the recently imposed sanctions against oil refineries, the correction in oil prices is a short-term trend.
Invezz:Refining margins have crashed to 2022 lows — which cracks (gasoline, diesel, jet) offer the best calendar-spread trades into 2026?
We should note that by now, refining margins have already recovered noticeably.
I agree that the levels are not as high as in 2022-2023, when the market was living in conditions of a real shortage of oil and fuel, but still, the price is quite confident.
As for the spreads in 2026, the gasoline–oil one is not of much interest right now: it stands above its seasonal “bottom”, and the growth potential there is almost depleted.
The only spread that is worth attention is the spread of Crude–Heating Oil.
It looks particularly interesting, as there is a shortage of diesel in the USA and Europe right now, so the difference is very high, and this creates an opportunity for sales with the expectation of returning to average levels.
The only risk that I see here is weather conditions. If the winter is too cold, prices for heating oil in winter can react to frosts with a very rapid increase.
This is where our weather model helps us a lot: with its help, we can get all the forecasts and a clear indication when to enter the position.
Outlook
Invezz:One bold call: Brent average in 2026 — above $90, sub-$70, or range-bound? And why?
If we look at 2026, I would bet on the average price of Brent in the range of $60-70. The market is oversupplied today, and I think it is the fairest price in these conditions, and the very structure of consumption is changing.
Electric vehicles, energy efficiency, and new technologies are gradually eating away at the demand for gasoline and diesel.
Meanwhile, shale producers in the United States continue to lower production costs, so they can expand production even at moderate prices. With such a combination of factors, a scenario with Brent rising above $90 looks unlikely.
But a dip below $60 is also not possible for any prolonged period of time — too many players are interested in keeping the market in a comfortable range.
Invezz:Where do you see India’s oil demand in the coming decade, especially if they have to completely stop purchasing Russian barrels?
I am sure that India will not completely abandon Russian oil anyway. The volumes are too large, and the market always gives room for agreements.
Russia accounts for about 8-10% of global production, and such volumes cannot be replaced overnight.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are also looking for where to sell their oil, and the competition in the market is very fierce.
To solve the dilemma, there will be some new schemes, partial replacements, and reissues of contracts between Russia and India, but the country will remain the main supplier of oil in one form or another.
At the same time, India itself is now becoming the main driver of global oil demand: the IEA estimates that the country’s output could add up to a million barrels per day by 2030.
So even if some of their Russian volumes temporarily drop out, the overall growth in consumption will not go away–India will still have to supply this demand somehow.
